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Historians have engaged in a continuing debate about whether the
officeholder makes the office or the office makes its holder. During his
twelve-year term, which included the most dynamic period of corporate
takeover activity in history, Chancellor William T. Allen carried on the
substantial and rich history of his predecessors. He also added new
dimensions to the position of Chancellor in his creative approach to
resolving the matters brought before him. One of his most notable
innovations in the area of corporate law was to breach the artificial
barricade that often separates legal decision-making from fundamental
principles of economics. The result was not only the reasonable
resolution of corporate disputes, but also fidelity to the economic
underpinnings of capital formation and to concepts of social utility.
Chancellor Allen is most widely known for his landmark decisions
in the field of corporate law. However, Chancellor Allen would
frequently tell people that he found the noncorporate cases within his
jurisdiction to be among the most interesting. As a court of equity,
the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over a variety of matters,
including applications for termination of life support. Chancellor Allen
often observed that the consideration of such cases constituted many
of his most challenging (and most rewarding) moments as a judge.
Chancellor Allen also brought a creative approach to the many
functional tasks confronting a trial judge. Because the Court of
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Chancery has no juries, he discouraged advocates from presenting
dramatic pleas, encouraging them instead to focus succinctly on a
reasoned analysis of the facts and law applicable to a given case. This
is not to say that Chancellor Allen did not demonstrate an appreciation
for drama. In fact, Chancellor Allen was an avid supporter of the arts
generally, and drama specifically. The Chancellor's love of drama is
reflected in a number of his decisions, which often built a level of
suspense, leaving the reader unsure of the conclusion until the final
pages of his opinion.
His approach to evidentiary issues was refreshingly pragmatic.
Rather than slavishly adhere to precedent on interpretation of the
hearsay rule or other rules of evidence, Chancellor Allen would
repeatedly adopt an approach that could be summarized in one
fundamental question: assuming that the rule in question was intended
to achieve justice and aid the court in determining the truth, will its
proposed application in this case further revelation or concealment of
the truth? While some of Chancellor Allen's rules, interpretations, and
decisions have been read as aberrational, they clearly achieved just
results.
Chancellor Allen taught many of us some new lessons on effective
advocacy. As a practicing attorney, I had the privilege of joining
Chancellor Allen on a panel presentation to new lawyers on the art of
written advocacy. In Chancellor Allen's view, effective advocacy
should be "transparent." Transparency, he would explain, required
presentation of an argument without the use of invective, without
underlining, and without bombast. If some action by an adversary
truly was "clear," "irrefutable," "outrageous," or "patently false," it
did not require characterization as such. Chancellor Allen emphasized
that the true art of advocacy was found in the presentation of the facts
in a seemingly dispassionate manner, which nevertheless had the effect
of leading the reader inexorably to the conclusion that the advocate's
position was the appropriate result.
Chancellor Allen also told new lawyers that the great effort
expended by lawyers to find and cite back his own cases to him, in an
attempt to persuade him, might well be ineffective. As he explained,
it was far easier for him to accept an advocate's interpretation of a
decision rendered by a fellow judge. In contrast, it was easy for him
to disagree with the interpretation of decisions he had authored,
because he knew better than the advocate what specific facts drove the
result.
One exceedingly difficult task for any trial judge is to apply the
policies established by appellate courts to specific factual situations. In
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the realm of corporate governance disputes litigated in the Court of
Chancery, the job involves applying the developing views of the
Delaware Supreme Court on good corporate practice to situations
which often do not fit the mold. For example, the Delaware Supreme
Court has set strict standards for the pursuit of shareholder derivative
actions. Where no demand has been made on the corporation, demand
futility must be plead with a greater specificity than is required by
Chancery Court Rule 12(b). Many plaintiffs' lawyers had viewed the
hurdles of Aronson v. Lewis, which gives a board dominated by
independent directors primacy over the conduct of derivative litigation,
to be nearly insurmountable.' Perhaps sensing that the pendulum had
swung too far, Chancellor Allen was one of the first judges to find that
certain claims survived a motion to dismiss on the ground that they
raised a reasonable doubt that board actions were protected by the
business judgment rule.2
While giving broad deference to the informed exercise of business
judgment by directors, Chancellor Allen always remained a realist.
During his tenure on the bench, the court had the opportunity to
review a rash of leveraged buyout transactions, which typically involve
management maintaining a substantial equity stake and in which
minority investors are divested of any continuing interest in the
corporation. Following the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court
in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,' special negotiating committees of
independent directors became a frequent feature of the landscape. The
attempt to replicate arms-length bargaining in conflicted transactions
gave rise to a variety of difficult issues. Many practical guidelines are
found in Chancellor Allen's decisions, which emphasized the proactive
role to be played by special committees, as well as the necessary
availability of true veto power if the committee is to be afforded
judicial deference.4
Chancellor Allen consistently emphasized the pivotal role of
corporate lawyers in the effective functioning of corporate governance
mechanisms. His seminal article on the operation of special commit-
tees of outside directors exemplified his approach to board action
generally: for the court to maintain its traditional deference to
directorial prerogative, it is necessary that lawyers perform the critical
1. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
2. See Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., CIV. A. No. 11713, 1993 WL 35967, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan.
26, 1993).
3. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
4. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, CIV. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 21, 1988).
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functions of advising directors of their responsibilities and guiding the
board through the consideration of the appropriate alternatives.' He
frequently espoused his conviction that as officers of the court,
attorneys could not rely on their zealous representation of clients as a
factor limiting their role in ensuring good corporate practices.
Although the vast majority of Chancellor Allen's decisions were
affirmed on appeal, some of his most notable opinions were reversed.6
There are obvious ways in which trial judges can increase their chances
of affirmance and decrease the likelihood of reversal. Reliance on
factual, rather than legal determinations is one. Another is to write
opinions in such a manner as to suggest no doubt as to any issues
resolved in the context of the decision.
Chancellor Allen rejected this approach. He freely admitted that
many of the issues argued before him presented extremely close calls.
It is likely that Chancellor Allen's explicit discussion of his own doubts
and thought processes in reaching judgments resulted in making his
decisions easier to reverse. Chancellor Allen acknowledged this
possibility, yet steadfastly adhered to his approach. He felt that it was
his duty not only to decide the many difficult cases before him, but
also to memorialize the process through which those close cases were
decided.
In a larger sense, though, Chancellor Allen's style has best served
the clients and those from whom he expected the most: the lawyers
counseling those clients. In advising clients, the most instructive
decisions are not the ones that provide black and white rulings. Such
rulings allow (and perhaps encourage) clients to take extreme positions.
In contrast, the struggle over difficult issues reflected in Chancellor
Allen's writing permits the qualitative evaluation of facts and circum-
stances surrounding decisions made by clients with the help of their
advisors.
Chancellor Allen's retirement from the bench was a significant
loss to the judiciary. However, we can expect that his new position at
New York University will allow him to continue to help us try to
harmonize and improve the law governing the actions of corporate
directors.
5. W.T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45
Bus. LAW. 2055 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Cede v. Technicolor, Inc., CIV. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. Oct.
19, 1990), rev'd, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
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